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Social scientists and political theorists often claim that shared values are conducive to social
cohesion, and trust and solidarity in particular. Furthermore, this idea is at the heart of what
has been labeled the ‘national identity argument’, according to which religious and/or
cultural diversity is a threat to the shared (national) values underpinning social cohesion and
redistributive justice. However, there is no consensus among political theorists about what
values we need to share to foster social cohesion and indeed, for example, nationalists,
liberals, and multiculturalists provide different answers to this question. On the basis of
a survey conducted in Denmark in 2014, this study empirically investigates the relation
between, on the one hand, commitments to the community values of respectively
conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism, liberal citizenship, and multiculturalism, and
on the other, trust and solidarity. First, we investigate in what ways commitments to these
four sets of values are correlated to trust and solidarity at the individual level and, then,
whether the belief that others share one’s values is correlated to these aspects of social
cohesion for individuals committed to these four sets of values. We find that conservative
and liberal nationalism are negatively correlated to our different measures of trust and
solidarity, whereas liberal citizenship and (in particular) multiculturalism are positively
correlated. In broad terms, this picture remains when we control for a number of socio-
economic factors and ideology (on a left-right scale). Finally, individuals who believe that
others share their values do not, in general, have higher levels of trust and solidarity. Rather,
this belief works in different ways when associated with different sets of community values.
Keywords: social cohesion; trust; solidarity; national identity; shared values
Introduction
Political theorists concerned with social justice often make claims about the social
conditions under which redistributive principles may be implemented in policies.
And often, this involves making claims about the kinds of community that are
conducive to social cohesion, and trust and solidarity in particular. According to
this line of thought, redistribution requires individuals to have sufficient levels of
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solidarity with other members of society, and requires individuals to trust other
members, and not least trust that they will reciprocate contributions to the welfare
state; avoid tax evasion, not cheat with benefits, etc. (Miller, 2004: 27, 2006: 328).
Trust and solidarity, in turn, require certain kinds of bonds between community
members, where such bonds are often thought threatened by increasing levels of
religious and cultural diversity.
When specifying the kinds of bonds between community members thought to be
conducive to social cohesion, political theorists tend to invoke shared values
(Kymlicka, 2001; Miller, 2004; Miller and Ali, 2014). For example, according to
the so-called ‘national identity argument’, ‘societies whose members are united by
means of … [national identities] are able to achieve a range of desirable ends that
would otherwise be unobtainable’ (Miller and Ali, 2014: 1), not least trust,
solidarity and social justice. However, political theorists differ on the specific
content of the value-set that is to serve as a basis for identification with fellow
community members. Nationalists suggest that sharing a national culture is
required for (sufficient levels of) trust and solidarity, liberals that we need only share
a commitment to some basic liberal principles of justice, whereas multiculturalists
suggest that we need to share a commitment to the recognition of difference. We
shall refer to such value-sets as ‘community values’, as they are values thought to
bind community members together in ways that are conducive to social cohesion.
Such specific sets we shall refer to as ‘nationalist community values’, ‘multicultural
community values’, etc. to highlight their basis in specific political doctrines.
Nationalist community values, then, are the values nationalist political theorists
consider necessary for social cohesion at adequate levels, etc.
In this article, we empirically investigate the claim that community values form a
basis for social cohesion – a claim assumed in the argument for why redistribution
relies on such values. More specifically, we investigate a particular way in which
community values may impact social cohesion, namely the idea that commitments
to specific shared values tend to increase social cohesion at the individual level. This
idea is at the heart of the national identity argument. On the basis of a survey
conducted in Denmark in 2014, we study the correlation between, on the on hand,
commitments to the community values of respectively conservative nationalism,
liberal nationalism, liberal citizenship, and multiculturalism, and on the other, trust
and solidarity. This does not allow us to draw conclusions about causal directions in
the correlations we find. Nevertheless, when, for example, nationalists hypothesize
that a commitment to the national culture will tend to increase trust and solidarity
among co-nationals (Miller, 1995: Chs 4, 5), this gives rise to an expectation that
individuals who have such commitments will exhibit higher levels of trust and
solidarity toward co-nationals than individuals who do not. By looking at the
correlation between commitments to the national culture and trust and solidarity,
we are able to determine whether this expected relation holds or not. Similarly, we
are able to determine whether hypothesized relations between the other community
values mentioned above and trust and solidarity hold.
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However, an individual’s trust and solidarity may be a function not just of her
own values, but also of the extent to which she is a member of a community in
which these values are shared (Miller and Ali, 2014: 18, 19). Thus, as pointed out
above, political theorists often claim that social cohesion rests on shared values.
There may be different explanations of why the sharing of values matters, but one
such explanation that is frequently invoked is this: the belief that others share one’s
values such that one is a member of a community with a common identity tends to
generate trust in, and solidarity with, co-members of that community. Therefore, we
also test whether the belief that others share one’s values is correlated to trust and
solidarity among, for example, nationalists, as would be predicted if the above
explanation of the impact of shared values is true.
The concept of social cohesion is contested, multidimensional (refers to several
aspects such as trust, networks, reciprocity, stability, inter-group co-operation,
solidarity, and belonging) and figures as a common catchphrase in the general
public (Hooghe, 2007; Ariely, 2014; van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). Trust and
solidarity are selected because of their key role in the national identity argument
and, more generally, in theories about the social conditions required for imple-
menting redistributive justice. To allow for differential impact on different kinds of
trust, we distinguish between in-group, out-group, and generalized trust. This is
because specific community values may have different impacts regarding different
kinds of trust. Similarly, we use different measures of solidarity to capture both
general and out-group solidarity.
State of the art
In recent years, there has been an extensive scholarly debate within the social
sciences on whether ethnic diversity reduces trust and solidarity within a welfare
state. The empirical findings point in rather different directions and seem incon-
clusive at present (Putnam, 2000; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Torpe and Lolle,
2011; Torpe, 2012; Uslaner, 2012; van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014).
However, the question of whether certain community values or shared identities
impact trust and solidarity has received very limited attention. This is so in spite of the
fact that, in particular, nationalist political theorists have argued that diversity is a
threat to the shared (national) values underpinning social cohesion and redistributive
justice. While this national identity argument has received a great deal of attention in
academic debates, the impact of national identity on social cohesion has only been
tested in a few studies (Citrin et al., 2001; Martinez-Herrera, 2004, 2010; Shayo,
2009; Theiss‐Morse, 2009; Johnston et al., 2010; Wright and Reeskens, 2013).
Whether a national identity can actually serve the assumed function is therefore very
much an open question. Furthermore, as we pointed out in the introduction, several
other community values are by various political theorists claimed to bind community
members together in ways that are conducive to social cohesion. These other sets of
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values have more or less been neglected in empirical studies and insofar as they have
been studied, they have primarily been included in studies measuring the impact of
such values at the level of policy (Crepaz, 2006; Torpe, 2012) and at the country level
(Hjerm and Schnabel, 2012).
The results from the handful of studies testing the national identity argument are
rather inconclusive and contradictory (Miller and Ali, 2014: 2). In one of the few
cross-national studies testing this argument, Shayo (2009) finds not only a negative
correlation between national identification (measured as national pride) and sup-
port for redistribution at the individual level, but also a strong negative correlation
between national identification and levels of actual redistribution on the country
level. In a Canadian study in which national identity is measured as ‘closeness’ to the
nation, Johnston et al. (2010) find partial support for the argument put forward by
liberal nationalists, as ‘national identity contributes to a sense of belonging and
solidarity that transcends economic interest and cultural differences’, but only when
it comes to certain sub-domains of the welfare state (Johnston et al., 2010: 350).
A British study calls the liberal nationalist hypothesis into question as it finds no
impact of national identification (measured as ‘support for the political commu-
nity’) on support for the welfare state (Martinez-Herrera, 2004). Furthermore,
a couple of US studies find that national identity at the individual level has no
significant impact on beliefs about social justice in terms of spending on health,
education, and welfare (Citrin et al., 2001; Theiss-Morse, 2009).
Hjerm and Schnabel (2012) use xenophobia as a proxy for individual national
identity and find that ethnically based national identities have a positive impact on
support for the welfare state. AndWright and Reeskens (2013) distinguish between
ethnic national identity, cultural national identity, and civic national identity, and
find that (only) ethnic national identity is conducive to redistribution and that all
three national conceptions induce welfare chauvinism against immigrants.
These studies illustrate some of the difficulties in testing the national identity
argument. Thus, the contradictory nature of the results may to some extent reflect
different analytical frameworks, statistical approaches, and measures applied.
Furthermore, these studies rely on different notions of national identity. This raises
the question of exactly what it means to have a shared national identity. As Miller
and Ali (2014) argue, national identity can be measured in several ways, including
as national attachment, national pride, and uncritical/critical patriotism, where
results may very much depend on how it is measured.
A further complication is that these studies tend not to appropriately distinguish
between different community values. This is due to the fact that national attach-
ment, national pride, etc. do not tell us anything about what aspects of the nation it
is that individuals feel attached to or proud of. So when, for example, Shayo (2009)
measures national identity in terms of national pride, it is not clear whether his
results tell us anything interesting about the national identity argument as it is
usually conceived by nationalists. To illustrate this point, suppose that French
citizens generally identify with their nation in virtue of the French republican model.
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In that case, correlations between national identification and trust and solidarity
may say more about the impact of republican community values than about the
impact of what are strictly nationalist community values. The latter will, after all,
emphasize cultural aspects of the nation.
Wright and Reeskens (2013) do go some way toward accommodating different
notions of national identity. However, we would argue that their operationalization
of ethnic, cultural, and civic national identity is fragile, not least because each
national identity relies only on a single measure. For example, cultural national
identity is measured as the importance respondents ascribed to ‘speaking
the country’s national languages’. While they find this measure to be the closest
available to capturing commitments of liberal nationalists (Wright and Reeskens,
2013: 1450), it only rather weakly approximates liberal nationalist commitments.
The study of the relation between community values and social cohesion is in
many ways still in its infancy and this study differs from those mentioned above in
several ways. First, it explicitly differentiates between four different sets of com-
munity values, where each of them is based on a broad range of measures in order to
strengthen reliability and approximation to the values claimed by political theorists
to foster social cohesion. Second, we study not only correlations between specific
values and trust and solidarity, but between sharing these values with others and
these two aspects of social cohesion. Third, we use a wider range of measures of
trust and solidarity than the studies discussed above. And finally, we study the
relation between community values and social cohesion in a country where this has
so far not been tested, namely Denmark.
Theory
Political theorists arguing for, for example, nationalism, liberalism, or multi-
culturalism will often have views not just about the justice of social arrangements,
but also (empirical) views about the social conditions required for implementing
justice. Indeed, they will often hold that the values they propose as the basis for just
social arrangements will furthermore, insofar as they are shared among citizens,
tend to promote social cohesion and in particular, trust and solidarity, and so make
feasible the implementation of social justice. The sharing of values fosters identifi-
cation with other members of one’s community, which again tends to facilitate
positive attitudes toward them such as trust and solidarity (Miller, 2004). Of
course, the idea that shared values promote social cohesion is not unique to political
theorists, as it is widely held in the social sciences (Hooghe, 2007: 717), but political
theorists tend to argue for more specific views about what these values consist of.
Let us briefly say a little about each of the specific sets of community values we
examine in this study. Conservative nationalists hold that social cohesion is best
promoted by sharing an entire, or at least large part of a, national culture (Burke,
1790; Scruton, 1990). The idea is that stable, democratic political institutions
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require a thick, pre-political community, where community members identify with
each other on the basis of a common history, common culture, and (more generally)
common way of life, underpinning a sense of a shared fate. In particular, liberal
democratic principles are thought too thin and abstract to foster the emotional
attachments required for social cohesion.
Liberal nationalists share with conservative nationalists the commitment to
a national culture, insisting that, for example, trust ‘is much more likely to exist
among people who share a common national identity, speak a common language,
and have overlapping values’ (Miller, 1998: 48). However, liberal nationalists
suggest that national identities are not static but transformed over time and need to
be sufficiently open so that, for example, immigrants can realistically access them.
Furthermore, they stress the importance of a shared commitment to liberal political
structures as a basis for social cohesion (Miller, 1995: Chs 4, 5; Kymlicka, 2001:
258). This means that there are aspects of national cultures that liberal and
conservative nationalists may disagree about; for example, liberal nationalists may
be wary of including a particular religion in the national identity (Miller, 1995: 92),
whereas conservative nationalists may be more inclined to do so (Scruton, 1990:
300, 315).
Liberal citizenship, as we construe this set of community values here, has both
liberal and republican elements. The republican element pertains to ‘active citizen-
ship’ and more specifically to democratic participation and being an active member
of one’s community. Thus, according to republicans, solidarity is grounded in ‘a
reflective acceptance of certain obligations and in practical engagement’ (Honohan,
2010: 94). Along similar lines, Putnam (2000: 136, 137) suggests that civic
engagement, trust, and solidarity may tend to mutually reinforce one another.
The liberal element in liberal citizenship involves a commitment to a set of basic
(liberal) principles of justice. Such principles may include freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, toleration, and equality of opportunity. For example, Rawls
(1971: 498, Sections 69, 76) argues that a society in which his liberal principles of
justice are widely shared and (known to be) implemented in its basic structure will
generate its own support, where a sense of justice and trust in one’s fellow citizens
will tend to mutually support each other, and where trust in others to comply with
the requirements of justice will tend to affirm one’s commitment to this value and
the institutions in which it is realized. Furthermore, Uslaner (2002: 2, 3) argues that
trust and solidarity are part of – and fostered by – a larger package of (roughly)
liberal values, including equal standing, equality of opportunity, and opposition to
hierarchy, and based on the belief that other people share these values.
Finally, according to multiculturalism, social cohesion is best (or adequately)
promoted by sharing a commitment to the recognition of difference. In particular,
such recognition may tend to promote the allegiance of minorities who would
otherwise feel they receive insufficient opportunities to express their religious and
cultural identities (Kymlicka, 1995: 184, 185), an allegiance that may again increase
majority trust in, and solidarity with, minorities. Furthermore, multicultural
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commitments may raise majority sensitivity to minority concerns and in this way
foster trust and solidarity across groups (Murphy, 2012: 117).
Here, we aim to investigate a particular mechanism through which community
values may affect social cohesion, namely that commitments to specific values lead
to trust and solidarity at the individual level. The arguments of conservative and
liberal nationalists outlined above are clearly of this kind, since they rely on the idea
that identifying with others on the basis of a shared nationality generates trust in –
and solidarity with – them. It is less clear that, for example, the multicultural
argument that recognition promotes the allegiance of minorities is of this kind, and
so predicts an association of specific values and trust and solidarity at the individual
level. Nevertheless, both the argument that multicultural commitments raises
sensitivity to minority concerns and the argument that liberal values and trust
and solidarity mutually reinforce each other at the individual level are of the
relevant kind.
Note also a further respect in which explanations of the impact of community
values on social cohesion may differ. Sharing a particular set of values may impact
trust and solidarity simply because individuals who have these values are more
likely to exhibit trust and solidarity, or because sharing these values makes
an independent contribution to these aspects of social cohesion (Holtug,
Forthcoming). In case of the former, we would expect effects to turn up in corre-
lations between individual values and trust and solidarity. In case of the latter, we
would expect effects (or at least full effects) to turn up in correlations between
individual values in conjunction with the belief that these values are shared by other
community members on the one hand, and trust and solidarity on the other. At least
a standard explanation of why shared identities matter is that it is easier to extend
sympathy and trust toward individuals with whomwe identify, where identification
is based on beliefs about common attributes (Miller, 2014: 13, 14). Indeed, this
particular explanation of the significance of shared identities finds support in social
identity theory, according to which in-group favoritism and out-group prejudice
can result from identifying with the former group (Voci, 2006).
Therefore, in the following, we test correlations not only between commitments
to the four sets of community values listed above and trust and solidarity, but also
between commitments to each of these sets in conjunction with the belief that these
values are shared with other community members and trust and solidarity.
Operationalization, data, and methods
The representative sample in our survey includes 1282 respondents above 18 years
of age. Data for the survey were collected in October to December 2014 by Statistics
Denmark (pilot study in September 2014). The survey sample was drawn from
Danish registry data, covering all of the adult population in Denmark. Responses
were collected both via internet and phone (log-in and password for the survey sent
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by letter, phone follow-up if respondents had not replied after 2 weeks). With a
response rate of 57.0, the final survey sample is representative of the population in
terms of gender, age, income, education, and socio-economic status (labor market
position).1
To keep different reasons for identifying with a particular community apart, we
have constructed value-indexes for each of the four sets of community values out-
lined in the last section in order to measure individual commitments to them. The
main independent variables in our study are the four indexes expressing community
values: conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism, multiculturalism, and liberal
citizenship. The value-indexes are based on 25 different variables consisting in
value-statements, which are listed in Appendix 1. All variables are Likert scale
questions with five categories on which respondents have been asked to indicate
their degree of agreement or disagreement (agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither
agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly). The resulting indexes are
computed to range from 0 to 100, where a score of 0 means that the respondent
disagrees completely with all variables included in the index, whereas a score of 100
means that the respondent completely agrees with all statements.
Briefly, the conservative nationalist index includes values such as believing that
everyone in Denmark should follow Danish traditions and that Danish culture and
history and Christianity should be fundamental in schools. The liberal nationalist
index includes values such as holding that a commitment to Denmark and Danish
culture is important for being a part of Danish society and that citizenship requires
knowledge of Danish history, culture, and society. The liberal citizenship index
indicates an emphasis on the importance of voting, equality of opportunity,
freedom of religion and speech, and active participation in society. Finally, the
multiculturalism index emphasizes that it is best if a country has a mix of religions
and that different religions should be on an equal footing in school curricula and in
terms of state support, that Muslim women should be able to wear a headscarf on
the job and that mother tongue instruction should be available.
The three indexes of conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism, and multi-
culturalism are robust indexes with Chronbach’s α of 0.745, 0.626, and 0.740,
respectively. This indicates that the variables making up each of these indexes
correlate sufficiently with each other. The index of liberal citizenship is somewhat
weaker with Chronbach’s α at 0.495. Themedian of the index of liberal nationalism
is 75.0 (relatively high agreement with this index in the population in general),
1 Minor mismatches between survey population and sample reflect that response rates were somewhat
lower among groups with lower socio-economic status. For example, 35% of the population only has basic
school-level education, whereas it is 27% of the survey. The corresponding mismatch in terms of non-
employment is 36 vs. 32%. The survey is also representative in terms of gender and age, although there is
some under-representation of the youngest. 18–34 years old make up 26% of the population, but 20% of
the survey sample. Statistical weighting according to these characteristic will be used when showing simple
frequencies in Tables 1 and 2, but not in later regression analyses (where the very same variables are
controlled for in the analysis).
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whereas the medians of the three other indexes are 50–57 (not shown). With a std.
dev. of 36 (68% of the survey sample score up to 36 points above or below the index
mean), the index of liberal citizenship has a relatively high degree of variance,
whereas the three other indexes all have std. dev. between 20 and 23 (not shown).
The indexes are somewhat interrelated. Unsurprisingly, conservative nationalism
and liberal nationalism are positively correlated, while both are negatively corre-
lated with multiculturalism (not shown here). The index of liberal citizenship,
however, is positively correlated with all the other three indexes, but most strongly
with multiculturalism (Pearson’s correlation of 0.240). In other words, the index of
liberal citizenship to some extent captures respondents with strong value orienta-
tions regardless of the content of these values (at least in relation to the three other
indexes).
Presumably, the interrelation of the indexes reflects both that a commitment to
more than one index is sometimes to be expected for theoretical reasons, but also
that people’s commitments often do not track theoretical positions tightly. As
regards the former, we would expect conservative nationalists to also endorse the
attitudes of the liberal nationalism index and so, for example, hold that Danish
culture is important for being a part of Danish society. Likewise, we would expect
liberal nationalists to endorse liberal values.
We should emphasize that our selection of variables is based on the theoretically
motivated hypotheses we want to test, and so that the empirical interrelations
between the indexes does not threaten the theoretical coherence of the distinctions
between them. Furthermore, as it turns out, the indexes produce interestingly
different results suggesting that important differences between people are in fact
captured by these indexes. Nevertheless, the indexes of conservative and liberal
nationalism are highly correlated with a Pearson’s correlation of 0.635. Cross-
validation with confirmatory factor analysis shows that it is acceptable to distin-
guish between the two nationalisms looking only at conventional standards for
goodness-of-fit measures, but confirms that the two are highly correlated (not
shown).2This suggests that the scores on these two indexes are quite similar to each
other for many respondents, raising the question of whether the two nationalisms
are meaningfully different empirically.
The main worry is that many people with high scores on the liberal nationalism
index also have high scores of conservative nationalism and so that correlations to
trust and solidarity of the former index may be unduly influenced by conservative
attitudes. On this basis, we also conduct a separate analysis of liberal nationalists
with low scores of conservative nationalism.
A final concern is the issue of multicollinearity when both indexes are included in
the same regression model. Multicollinearity means that highly correlated predictor
2 Comparative fit index = 0.931; Tucker–Lewis index = 0.901; root mean squared error of approxi-
mation = 0.070; standardized root mean squared residual = 0.041. Standardized correlation between the
two nationalisms = 0.91.
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variables (the two indexes) can produce unreliable coefficients and inflate variance
(large standard errors). Therefore, all relationships between our four indexes have
been checked for variance inflation (not shown here). The variance inflation factor is
at no point above 2.0. Multicollinearity should therefore not be an issue.
Besides the four indexes of community values, the belief that one’s values are
shared by other community members is also included as an important independent
variable. The question put to respondents was this: ‘Generally – to what degree do
you believe that your values are shared by other Danes?’. In the survey, the great
majority of respondents perceive values to be shared to some degree. In total, 27%
believe that values are shared to a ‘high degree’, whereas 62% reply ‘to some
degree’. Only 10% reply ‘to a lesser degree’ and 1% say ‘not at all’.
As pointed out above, the dependent variables consist in different measures of
trust and solidarity (three measures of each). What the best way is to measure
generalized trust has been widely discussed (Delhey et al., 2011, 2014; Torpe and
Lolle, 2011). In particular, researchers have raised doubts about the classic,
dichotomous measure of trust in ‘most people’. Based on these observations, Delhey
et al. (2014) argue that, for example, trust in people you meet for the first time is a
better proxy for generalized trust than the classic, dichotomous measure. In this
study, we apply three different measures of trust, namely in-group trust (trust in
‘ethnic Danes’), generalized trust (trust in people you meet for the first time), and
out-group trust (trust in immigrants). (For the exact wording of our three measures,
see online appendix Table 2A.)
We operationalize solidarity as support for redistribution and employ three
different measures thereof. The first concerns the extent to which one believes that,
on the whole, the state should ensure that people have adequate living conditions.
The second concerns the extent to which one believes that the state should increase
its efforts for the worse off, even if it means higher taxes. And the third concerns the
extent to which one believes that the state is responsible for securing adequate living
conditions for immigrants and refugees (see online appendix Table A2). Here, the
second measure responds to a concern, expressed by Miller (2006), that a strong
sense of national identity is particularly important for sustaining support for
welfare state policies targeted at the poor (see also Johnston et al., 2010: 352).
Linear regression is used to investigate the degree to which we can identify
associations between the four indexes of community values on the one hand and
trust and solidarity on the other. Standardized regression coefficients (ranging from
−1 to 1) will be reported since they are better suited for comparing the correlations
of different variables within the same model. These coefficients are standardized
according to the different variances for each variable, that is, the regression coeffi-
cients should be read as the change, measured in standard deviations, on the
dependent variable (trust and solidarity) given a change of 1 std. dev. in the inde-
pendent variable. Besides the main dependent and independent variables explained
above, we control for a range of variables typical to the literature on attitudes,
including socio-economic background and ideological orientation (Svallfors, 2010).
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These are gender, age, education, and ideological self-placement on a left-right
scale. In addition, we include the aforementioned variable on the degree to which
the respondent believes that his or her values are shared by other Danes.
Results
Tables 1 and 2 depict the simple associations between the four indexes and each of
the six measures of trust and solidarity according to whether respondents are above
the median on each index. For example, 53.7% of those who score above the
median on the index of conservative nationalism indicate that they somewhat or
completely trust people they meet for the first time. Of those who score at the
median or below, 71.6% are trusting of people they meet for the first time. In other
words, there is a negative correlation between conservative nationalism and trust in
strangers.
Furthermore, Tables 1 and 2 also reveal the trust and solidarity of those who
perceive their values to be shared by other Danes ‘to a high degree’. For example,
54.4% of these respondents also indicate that they trust people they meet for the
first time. Among respondents indicating any other of the three response categories
on this variable, 65.8% trust people they meet for the first time.
The general pattern is that conservative and liberal nationalism are negatively
associated with trust (except for trust in people of Danish origin), whereas the
opposite is true of liberal citizenship and (in particular) multiculturalism.
Across all indexes, trust in people of Danish origin is higher than trust in immi-
grants. However, the difference between trust in immigrants and trust in people of










Trust in strangers 53.7 (71.6) 54.5 (67.9) 69.8 (56.5) 64.2 (61.4) 54.4 (65.8)
Trust in Danes 81.1 (82.7) 81.2 (83.0) 86.2 (77.9) 83.3 (80.7) 78.7 (83.0)
Trust in
immigrants
47.2 (71.6) 45.9 (71.7) 74.6 (46.6) 62.9 (56.8) 43.7 (65.9)
For the four indexes, responses from people scoring above the median of each index are indi-
cated (median or below in parentheses).
For perceived share values, responses from people replying that values are perceived to be
shared with other Danes ‘to a high degree’ indicated (‘to some degree’, ‘to a lesser degree’, or
‘not at all’ in parentheses).
For the three trust variables, ‘trust wholly’ or ‘trust somewhat’ is indicated.
Results have beenweighted by gender, age, income, education, employment status, and regional
home address.
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Danish origin is relatively low for respondents scoring high on multiculturalism,
whereas there is a big gap between these two forms of trust for respondents with
high scores on conservative and liberal nationalism. Furthermore, for these two
indexes, there is no significant difference between people above and below the
median when asked about trust toward people of Danish origin.
As regards solidarity, the two nationalisms are negatively correlated to it, whereas
the opposite is true of liberal citizenship and particularly multiculturalism. The four
indexes have a stronger correlation with solidarity toward those at the bottom of
society in comparison to their correlation with attitudes toward public responsibility
for general living standards. In other words, the difference in solidarity between
people who are above and below the median on each index is larger when asked
specifically about support for the worse off. Differences become even larger when
asked about solidarity with immigrants. In addition, differences in solidarity across
the four indexes are larger in the case of attitudes toward efforts for the worse off and
larger still when asked about immigrants, with people endorsing liberal citizenship
and multiculturalism exhibiting higher levels of solidarity in each case.
Interestingly, the correlation of perceived shared values with trust and solidarity
appears to be negative This may be puzzling if the expectation is that shared values
promote social cohesion. However, if we investigate the content of the values
perceived to be shared, we may get closer to an explanation. Simple bivariate
correlations between this variable and the four indexes were made. Especially,
conservative and liberal nationalists perceive values to be shared (Pearson’s corre-
lations of 0.239 and 0.280, respectively, with ‘shared values’), whereas there is










Living standards a public rather
than private responsibility
53.3 (61.1) 52.3 (61.2) 65.5 (50.6) 60.3 (54.8) 48.1 (61.0)
Efforts toward the worse off should
be improved despite higher taxes
34.3 (49.7) 36.7 (46.1) 50.7 (34.2) 46.6 (38.2) 33.3 (45.4)
Living standards for immigrants
a public rather than private
responsibility
44.7 (68.5) 42.7 (71.0) 73.3 (43.9) 61.3 (54.1) 42.7 (63.2)
For the four indexes, responses from people scoring above the median of each index are indi-
cated (median or below in parentheses).
For perceived share values, responses from people replying that values are perceived to be
shared with other Danes ‘to a high degree’ indicated (‘to some degree’, ‘to a lesser degree’, or
‘not at all’ in parentheses).
For the three solidarity variables, the share of respondents indicating 6–10 on the 0–10 scales
(see online appendix) is reported.
Results have been weighted by gender, age, income, education, employment status, and regional
home address.
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a negative correlation between this variable and multiculturalism (−0.281). The
association with liberal citizenship is not significant.
Table 3 reveals the results of linear regression with each of the three measures of
trust as the dependent variable. In each case, two models are shown; the first is
multivariate regression with the four indexes and perceived shared values included.
This means we sort out correlations for each index ceteris paribus the other indexes
in the first model. The second model includes further controls for age, education,
gender, and ideological self-placement. This means that the final model assures us
that the correlations between the indexes and trust and solidary do not just reflect
individual differences in the control variables, such as ideology. However, it does
not fully address the issue of empirical overlap between the nationalisms, which we
will return to later.
Multiculturalism has a relatively strong and significant association with all three
measures of trust after control for all other variables, that is, multicultural attitudes
are associated with higher levels of trust. The same positive correlation applies to
liberal citizenship, but it is weaker and it is not significant in the case of trust toward
people of Danish origin.
Conservative and liberal nationalism remain significant only when investigating
trust specifically toward immigrants (with a negative correlation). It may be the case
that these two indexes are to some extent ‘explained away’ when we include the
socio-economic control variables. At least, conservative and liberal nationalism
are associated positively with age and negatively with education (not shown here).
The opposite associations apply to multiculturalism, but the strength of the
correlations are weaker.
Looking atR2, it is evident that the indexes are best attuned to explain variance in
trust toward immigrants. Before including the other control variables, the indexes
(along with perceived shared values) explain 20% of the variance on this measure of
Table 3. The correlation between community values and trust (with controls)
Trust in strangers Trust in other Danes Trust in immigrants
Conservative
nationalism
−0.056 −0.058 0.089* 0.065 −0.079* −0.093*
Liberal nationalism −0.087* −0.074 −0.035 −0.019 −0.146*** −0.130**
Multiculturalism 0.130*** 0.136*** 0.198*** 0.208*** 0.265*** 0.266***
Liberal citizenship 0.126*** 0.072* 0.084** 0.029 0.117*** 0.069*
Shared values 0.025 0.012 0.059 0.055 −0.065* −0.081**
Age 0.163*** 0.160*** 0.140***
Education 0.164*** 0.122*** 0.131***
Gender −0.054 −0.002 −0.028
Ideology −0.008 0.031 −0.006
R2 (N) 0.063 (1177) 0.111 (1141) 0.049 (1169) 0.082 (1133) 0.197 (1162) 0.231 (1126)
Standardized correlation coefficients.
***Significant at the 0.001 level; **significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level.
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trust. When all variables are included, the figure increases somewhat to 23%. And
‘perceived shared values’ remains significant only in the case of trust toward
immigrants, and the correlation is negative.
In terms of the control variables (as expected), we find that education and parti-
cularly age are positively correlated with trust, especially trust toward strangers.
Table 4 presents the results with the three indicators of solidarity as dependent
variables. Unsurprisingly, the indexes are better suited to explain solidarity with
immigrants (explained variance of 24%which increases to 28% in the final model).
Once again, multiculturalism remains significant across all models with positive
correlations, where the correlation is particularly strong in the case of solidarity
with immigrants. Conservative nationalism is significantly and negatively corre-
lated with solidarity toward the worse off and immigrants, whereas liberal
nationalism remains significantly related only to less solidarity with immigrants.
In terms of the control variables, age squared has been included for the three
measures of solidarity since the relationship between age and solidarity is not linear.
The correlations for age and age squared simply express that the relationship is
curvilinear with the oldest and the youngest age cohorts being least in favor of
public responsibility for living standards. Education matters less for solidarity,
whereas ideological orientation is very important (as expected, respondents on the
left incline toward public responsibility, whereas the right inclines toward personal
responsibility).
We still need to fully validate that conservative and liberal nationalism do not just
describe the same variation in individual attitudes. Therefore, we did an indepen-
dent analysis of individuals who are liberal nationalists, but not conservative
nationalists. We singled out those who fall at or above the median on the liberal
nationalism index but below the median on the conservative nationalism index.
These individuals may simultaneously be at or above the median on the liberal
Table 4. The correlation between community values and solidarity (with controls)
General living standards Worse off Immigrants
Conservative nationalism 0.030 0.031 −0.121*** −0.123** −0.137*** −0.154***
Liberal nationalism −0.064 −0.072 0.051 0.050 −0.148*** −0.165***
Multiculturalism 0.202*** 0.179*** 0.214*** 0.191*** 0.260*** 0.254***
Liberal citizenship 0.069* 0.043 0.021 −0.013 0.135*** 0.083**
Shared values −0.078** −0.057 −0.072* −0.036 −0.061* −0.062*
Age 0.542** 0.574*** 0.503***
Age2 −0.438** −0.405** −0.318*
Education −0.039 0.016 0.005
Gender 0.032 0.016 0.051*
Ideology −0.191*** −0.096***
R2 (N) 0.073 (1180) 0.124 (1145) 0.089 (1176) 0.192 (1142) 0.235 (1179) 0.284 (1143)
Standardized correlation coefficients.
***Significant at the 0.001 level; **significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level.
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citizenship and even the multiculturalism index, but theoretically this is fine because
liberal nationalists will, by definition, have liberal attitudes and may well have some
multicultural attitudes as well [e.g. Kymlicka (2001) combines multiculturalism and
liberal nationalism is this way]. We compared these liberal nationalists with indi-
viduals who score at or above the median on the conservative nationalism index.
In Table 5, we compare trust and solidarity among respondents belonging to
these two conceptions of nationalism. Belonging to the above definition of liberal
nationalism is simply indicated by a dummy variable, that is, conservative nation-
alists become the reference category. Included are the same socio-demographic
control variables as before.
The results show that, on this new index of liberal nationalism, liberal national-
ists are significantly more trusting and solidaristic across all measures than
conservative nationalists. The control variables generally show the same
Table 5. Trust and solidarity of conservative and liberal nationalists
Trust
Trust in strangers Trust in other Danes Trust in immigrants
Liberal nationalist (dummy) 0.120** 0.054 0.209***
Shared values 0.017 0.020 −0.115**
Age 0.118** 0.135** 0.022
Education 0.179*** 0.153*** 0.235***
Gender −0.018 0.06 0.025
Ideology 0.013 0.054 −0.059
R2 (N) 0.060 (561) 0.047 (556) 0.145 (550)
Solidarity
General living standards Worse off Immigrants
Liberal nationalist (dummy) 0.105* 0.136** 0.209***
Shared values −0.071 −0.076 −0.113*
Age 0.335 0.370 0.551*
Age2 −0.280 0.183 −0.392
Education −0.037 0.015 0.070
Gender 0.032 −0.001 0.051
Ideology −0.139** −0.214*** −0.092*
R2 (N) 0.056 (563) 0.121 (559) 0.119 (560)
Only respondents belonging to one of the following two categories:
‘Conservative’ nationalism defined as scoring at the median or above on conservative
nationalism (regardless of whether the respondent is also at the median or above on liberal
nationalism and liberal citizenship).
‘Liberal’ nationalism defined as scoring at the median or above on liberal nationalism, but not
conservative nationalism (regardless of whether the respondent also scores at the median or
above on multiculturalism and/or liberal citizenship).
Standardized correlation coefficients.
***Significant at the 0.001 level; **significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level.
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correlations as before, even if they are not always significant in this case. Note,
however, that these two groups of nationalists also differ in their commitments to
liberal citizenship (to which some respondents in both groups are committed) and
multiculturalism (to which some liberal but no conservative nationalists are com-
mitted). Naturally, this may affect the trust and solidarity of both groups. The
important thing is that there is a group of respondents for whom conservative and
liberal nationalism is not the same thing, and that this has implications for trust and
solidarity.
Finally, Table 6 reveals some interesting interactions between the indexes and
the perception that personal values are shared by others. When we include this
interaction term, we ask ourselves not only how much perceived shared values
matters for trust and solidarity, but whether the combination of perceived shared
values and specific sets of community values is independently associated with trust
and solidarity.
This appears to be the case, but the interaction is not significant in all cases. One
explanation for this could be that there are extremely few respondents saying that
their values are shared only to a limited degree. Hence, there is not much variation
on this variable in the Danish context. Nevertheless, the interaction emerges in
some cases.
Shown in Table 6 are only the significant interaction terms. In all cases, the index
variables and the variable on perceived shared values have been centered around
their mean.












Conservative nationalism −0.058 0.063 −0.094* 0.032 −0.122**
Liberal nationalism −0.078* −0.015 −0.126** −0.066 0.046
Multiculturalism 0.136*** 0.209*** 0.266*** 0.179*** 0.191***
Citizenship 0.075* 0.024 0.065* 0.039 −0.009
Age 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.141*** 0.557*** 0.573***
Age2 – −0.454** −0.405***
Education 0.163*** 0.119*** 0.133*** −0.031 0.015
Gender −0.054 −0.002 −0.030 0.031 0.019
Ideology −0.005 0.031 0.004 −0.194*** −0.263***
Shared values 0.010 0.047 −0.078** −0.055 −0.040
Multiculturalism× shared values −0.063* – −0.056* 0.073** –
Conservative
nationalism× shared values
– – – 0.065*
Liberal citizenship× shared
values
– −0.072* – –
R2 (N) 0.115 (1141) 0.087 (1133) 0.129 (1145) 0.192 (1142)
Standardized correlation coefficients.
***Significant at the 0.001 level; **significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level.
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As can be seen, when significant, the interaction term generally has the
opposite direction of the original index variable. For example, while conservative
nationalism is negatively correlated with solidarity toward the worse off, the
interaction term is positively correlated. In other words, conservative nationalists
exhibit higher solidarity than they otherwise would have if they perceive that their
values are shared by others to a high degree. This positive interaction is not as strong
as the negative correlation from conservative nationalism itself, but it is there.
Similarly, highly multicultural orientations are associated with lower trust in
strangers when values are perceived to be shared (more precisely, such respondents
are not quite as highly trusting as other highly multicultural respondents who do
not, to the same extent, perceive their values to be shared). However, in one
of the five cases listed, the interaction goes in the same direction as the original
index variable. Highly multicultural respondents express even higher general
solidarity when they perceive their values to be shared.
Discussion
According to the national identity argument, sharing a commitment to a national
identity tends to promote trust and solidarity among community members. Here,
the notion of a national identity is to be understood at least in part in cultural terms.
On this basis, it may be predicted that individuals who have such commitments to
the nation will have higher levels of trust and solidarity than individuals who do
not, everything else being equal.
However, this is not what we find. Both conservative and liberal nationalism is
negatively correlated to trust and solidarity. In fact, of the six measures of trust and
solidarity we use, it is only trust in people of Danish origin that does not correlate
negatively with these two forms of nationalism (and even here, there is no positive
correlation). When we control for socio-economic factors and ideology, some of
these correlations drop to insignificance, but for trust in – and solidarity with –
immigrants the correlation remains negative, as does the correlation between
conservative nationalism and solidarity with the worse off.
Lower levels of trust in – and solidarity with – immigrants may reflect that
respondents attracted to nationalism tend not to see immigrants as co-nationals.
What is perhaps more worrying for proponents of the national identity argument
is that not even in-group trust and solidarity seem to be positively impacted by
commitments to the cultural nation.
It is not only nationalist political theorists whomake claims about the significance
of community values for social cohesion, so do liberals and multiculturalists.
And indeed, consistently with these claims, both the liberal citizenship and multi-
culturalist index correlates positively with all our measures of trust and
solidarity, although multiculturalism more so. When we impose controls for socio-
economic status, ideology, etc., liberal citizenship remains positively correlated
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to trust in strangers and in immigrants, as well as to solidarity with immigrants.
Furthermore, multiculturalism remains positively correlated to all six measures.
In fact, it is striking that multiculturalist respondents not only have higher levels of
trust in immigrants than nationalist respondents (which may have been expected),
but also have higher levels of trust in people of Danish origin.
To some extent, the positive relationship between multicultural values and trust
and solidarity challenges a worry that has been articulated by a number of theorists,
namely that multiculturalism drives down social cohesion by emphasizing differ-
ence at the expense of commonalities between citizens (Barry, 2001; Uslaner, 2012).
Thus, according to Uslaner (2012: 59), generalized trusters see their society as
united by common values and tend to oppose multicultural policies because of their
potentially divisive effects. We, on the other hand, find a positive relationship
between multicultural values and generalized trust. Nevertheless, there may of
course be effects on social cohesion of, for example, multicultural policies that we
do not pick up in a study such as this, which focusses on individual attitudes only
(however, for studies on the effects of multicultural policies, see Banting et al., 2006;
Hooghe et al., 2007).
Now, as pointed out above, an individual’s trust and solidarity may be a function
not just of her own values but also of the extent to which she is amember of a society
in which these values are shared by others. Indeed, political theorists tend to con-
sider social cohesion a function of shared values. Therefore, we have also tested the
relationship between particular community values and the belief that these values
are shared by others, on the one hand, and trust and solidarity on the other.
While it is not in general the case that individuals who believe that others share
their values have higher levels of trust and solidarity, interestingly, this belief works
in different ways when associated with different community values. Conservative
nationalists have higher levels of solidarity with the worse off if they believe that
others share their values than if they do not, whereas multiculturalists have lower
trust in strangers and immigrants (but higher general solidarity) if they have this
belief. The first of these findings is in accordance with what nationalist theory would
lead us to expect. Thus, the more you believe that other people share your (thick,
cultural) values, the more you will identify with them, where such identification
tends to promote trust and solidarity. Nevertheless, these effects of perceived
sharing do not fully compensate for the negative correlations of the indexes them-
selves, and our results contradict the national identity argument irrespective of
whether it is based on liberal or conservative nationalism, at least in a Danish
empirical setting.
The fact that we find the opposite relationship between the belief in shared values
and trust in the case of multiculturalism is more surprising. After all, multicultural
theorists have emphasized the importance of a shared recognition of difference for
social cohesion. However, a possible explanation may be this. For people who hold
multicultural values, these values may be in part a response to their perception of
living in a diverse society. Alternatively, it may just be the case that multiculturalists
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are more inclined to emphasize the diversity they find in their society than others
are. In either case, scoring highly on the multiculturalism index is associated with
a reduced belief in other people sharing one’s values, and since it is also associated
with higher levels of trust, this would explain why multiculturalists are more
trusting if they are less inclined to believe that their values are shared.
Does this mean that multiculturalist political theorists are mistaken in thinking
that a shared recognition of difference tends to foster social cohesion? Not neces-
sarily (Holtug, Forthcoming). First, if multiculturalist respondents are less inclined
to consider their values shared because they recognize the religious and cultural
diversity of the society they inhabit, this need not say anything about whether they
perceive their political (including multicultural) values to be shared. Second, shared
identities may have effects that our research design cannot capture. For example, it
is sometimes argued that multicultural policies tend to foster a sense of being treated
equally and belonging to a common political project among minorities.
The point that shared identities may impact social cohesion in ways that our
study is not designed to pick up pertains more generally to all the community values
considered here. Sharing an identity with other community members and believing
that one shares such an identity is not the same thing, and sharing may causally
impact social cohesion in ways that are not reflected in individual beliefs. Never-
theless, the idea that shared identities impact social cohesion on the basis of
individuals identifying more strongly with other members of their society because
they are united with them in terms of common values is widespread in political
theory and social science, and it relies on a causal account that seems to presuppose
that individuals perceive of other community members as sharing their own values.
And this, of course, is precisely the kind of pattern our study is designed to pick up.
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Appendix 1
Table A1. Variables included in four indexes of community values
Index: conservative nationalism
‘It is best for a country if nearly everyone follows the same customs and traditions’
‘The subject of Christianity should be compulsory for everyone in primary school, also those belonging to
a different faith’
‘Immigrants should adapt to Danish cultural traditions, for example, in relation to religious holidays’
‘People who do not belong to a Christian culture will never become truly Danish’
‘Daycare institutions should adapt only to Danish eating habits and, for example, serve pork for
everyone, even if some children for religious reasons do not want to eat it’
‘Danish culture and history should be at the very core of the curriculum in public elementary school’
‘Private and independent schools should only receive public support if they teach within the scope of
Danish values and culture’
Index: liberal nationalism
‘To become a part of Danish society, you should feel that you are a part of Danish culture’
‘People taking up permanent residence in this country should feel more attached to Denmark than to their
country of origin’
‘To be granted Danish citizenship, you should be able to exhibit knowledge of Danish history, culture and
society’
Index: multiculturalism
‘The state should require Danish companies to put in an extra effort to bring people from other ethnicities
into employment’
‘It is best for a country if there is a mix of different religions’
‘Teaching in the Christian faith should be put on the same footing in the school curriculum as teaching in
other world religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism and Islam’
‘Muslim women should be able to wear headscarves, for example, if they work in a supermarket’
‘Other religious communities should be on an equal footing with the Danish Evangelical Lutheran
Church in terms of economic support’
‘Danish Muslims have a right to build mosques’
‘Children of immigrants and refugees should have the right to be taught their native language in addition
to their ordinary classes in Danish’
Index: liberal citizenship
‘Everyone with the right to vote should vote in public elections’
‘All citizens should have the same opportunities in life, regardless of gender, ethnicity and social
background’
‘Everyone has the right to freely exercise their religion as long as they abide by the law’
‘Everyone living in Denmark should stay informed about Danish society’
‘People in local communities should cooperate on common issues, for example, upkeep of playgrounds,
waste separation, etc.’
‘Parents should be engaged in their children’s daycare institutions and schools, for example, by
participating in meetings’
‘Everyone who is able should participate actively in voluntary associations’
‘Women and men should have the same rights in society’
‘Homosexuals should have the same rights in society as other citizens’
‘Freedom of speech entails that all religions may be subject to criticism
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